Subject. The evolution of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy toolkit under the influence of structural shifts. Objectives. To describe the evolution of the monetary policy toolkit and provide quantitative verification of structural shifts, to identify systemic contradictions, and to develop the outlines of a sustainable paradigm of adaptive regulation. Methods. A combination of neo?institutional and post?Keynesian theoretical analysis was employed, along with classical statistics (time series analysis, correlation and regression analysis) and machine learning methods (a recurrent neural network architecture capable of capturing long?term dependencies in data sequences for forecasting and shift detection), as well as cluster analysis for objective periodization. Results. A fundamental transformation of the monetary policy toolkit was noted. It was found that, under the influence of exogenous shocks, a paradigm shift occurred from an inflation targeting regime based on the key rate to a hybrid model characterized by the dominance of administrative and distributional instruments. Quantitative verification recorded a structural shift in the mechanisms of money supply formation. Key systemic contradictions of the hybrid model were identified, including the conflict between fiscal and monetary goals, financial market segmentation, and the undermining of the classical transmission mechanism. The outlines of an adaptive hybrid regulation paradigm were developed, based on the principles of institutional separation of functions, managed marketness, radical transparency, and technological modernization. Conclusions. The novelty of the study lies in the synthesis of institutional analysis with the verification of structural shifts, as well as in the formulated principles of adaptive hybrid regulation for central banks operating under conditions of geopolitical turbulence.
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