Subject. Instruments and objectives of the monetary policy of central banks, as well as regulators’ measures to improve them. Objectives. To identify the specific features of approaches to modifying the objectives and instruments of monetary policy in global practice; to reveal the differences characteristic of the central banks of the EAEU countries. Methods. General methods of scientific cognition, comparison, and generalization were applied. Regulatory legal acts, official statistical sources, and publications of central banks of leading countries and the EAEU member states, as well as scientific works by foreign and Russian authors, were used. Results. The prerequisites and directions for changing the objectives of banking regulators in the development and implementation of monetary policy were disclosed, along with the key aspects of the debate on the need to establish its intermediate targets. An assessment was made of the achievement of operational targets in the EAEU countries in 2025; it was revealed that the central banks of Kazakhstan and Russia, which pursue inflation targeting and have established reference rates calculated on the basis of actual transactions, were able to manage overnight rates more effectively through monetary policy operations. Conclusions. Despite the active use of international experience in monetary policy decision?making, the central banks of most EAEU countries — which differ in terms of status, accountability, and objectives, as well as in their targeting regimes and methods for calculating reference rates — were unable to reduce inflation to the established parameters amid the unfavorable economic and geopolitical situation in 2020–2025. This underscores the need not only for a more substantiated selection of the instruments used but also for aligning them with fiscal policy, taking into account the growing tax burden (particularly in Kazakhstan and Russia).
Keywords: central bank, monetary policy, inflation targeting, benchmark rates
References:
Bindseil U. The operational target of monetary policy and the rise and fall of reserve position doctrine. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2004, no. 372, 44 p. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.533132
Bloomfield A.I. Monetary Policy under the international gold standard: 1880–1914. New York, Federal Reserve Bank, 1959, 62 p.
Friedman M. A Program for Monetary Stability. New York, Fordham University Press, 1959, 110 p.
Friedman M. Osnovy monetarizma [Fundamentals of monetarism]. Moscow, TEIS Publ., 2002, 175 p. (In Russ.)
Bindseil U., Jablecki J. Zombification and Central Bank Risk‑Taking: The Lender of Last Resort as a Signal Extraction Problem. Journal of Financial Crises, 2023, vol. 5, iss. 3, pp. 1–22. DOI: 10.17132/2693-3179.1513 EDN: PKJFWO
Meltzer A.H. A History of the Federal Reserve. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2003, 800 p.
Keynes J.M. A Treatise on Money: Vol. II: The Applied Theory of Money. London, Palgrave, 1971, 396 p.
Bindseil U. Monetary policy operations and the Financial System. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 319 p. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198716907.001.0001
Fridman M., Shvarts A.Ya. Monetarnaya istoriya Soedinennykh Shtatov 1867–1960 [Monetary history of the United States, 1867–1960]. Kiev, Vakler Publ., 2007, 861 p. (In Russ.)
Thornton D.L. The Dual Mandate: Has the Fed Changed Its Objective? Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 2012, vol. 94, pp. 117–134. DOI: 10.20955/r.94.117-134
Davis R.G. Intermediate Targets and Indicators for Monetary Policy: An Introduction to the Issues. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, vol. 15, pp. 71–82.
Oda N., Kazuo U. The Effects of the Bank of Japan’s Zero Interest Rate Commitment and Quantitative Monetary Easing on the Yield Curve: A Macro‑Finance Approach. Bank of Japan Working Paper Series, 2005, no. 05‑E‑6, 36 p.
Okina K., Shiratsuka S. Policy Commitment and Expectation Formation: Japan’s Experience Under Zero Interest Rates. North American Journal of Economics and Finance, 2004, vol. 15, iss. 1, pp. 75–100. DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2003.11.001
Walsh C.E. Goals and Rules in Central Bank Design. International Journal of Central Banking, 2015, vol. 11, iss. 4, pp. 295–352. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2597978
Rogoff K. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1985, vol. 100, iss. 4, pp. 1169–1189. DOI: 10.2307/1885679
Thornton D.L. How Did We Get to Inflation Targeting and Where Do We Need to Go to Now? A Perspective from the U.S. Experience. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, 2012, vol. 94, pp. 65–81. DOI: 10.20955/r.94.65-81
Svensson L.E.O. Optimal inflation Targets, “conservative” central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review, 1997, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 98–114. EDN: HEMBYV
Buklemishev O.V., Danilov Yu.A., Kokorev R.A. [Mega‑regulator as a result of evolution of financial regulation]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Seriya 6: Ekonomika, 2015, no. 4, pp. 52–74. (In Russ.) EDN: ULPHKL
