Subject. This article examines the hypothesis that, due to the evolutionary change in forms, capital structures and derivatives, the role of the self-regulating market in many countries has been called into question in terms of controls. Objectives. The article aims to prove that the structure of regulated exchanges and their user base has changed, and self-regulation, which affects the mechanism of ensuring the operation of proposed risk-removal and compliance products, can be a viable regulatory method and a valuable means of control. Methods. For the study, I used the methods of logical analysis, theoretical generalization and systematization. Results. The article proposes specific methods to improve the role of the self-regulating market. They point to the need for a more precise alignment of regulatory and market interest in market accountability. It can be argued that the hypothesis is proven. Conclusions. The structure of regulated exchanges, including their user base, has changed. The ability to access trading platforms electronically was a major factor. Self-regulation, which obliges market operators to maintain operational and internal controls, makes the market more responsible for its operation and reduces the amount of regulatory resources expended.
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