+7 925 966 4690, 9am6pm (GMT+3), Monday – Friday
ИД «Финансы и кредит»

JOURNALS

  

FOR AUTHORS

  

SUBSCRIBE

    
Finance and Credit
 

Debt restructuring in the credit market: theory and Russian practice

Vol. 22, Iss. 24, JUNE 2016

PDF  Article PDF Version

Received: 21 March 2016

Received in revised form: 11 April 2016

Accepted: 24 May 2016

Available online: 29 June 2016

Subject Heading: Banking

JEL Classification: E44, G21, G32, G34

Pages: 2-16

Burakov D.V. Financial University under Government of Russian Federation, Moscow, Russian Federation
Dbur89@yandex.ru

Importance The increasing problems in the financial sphere of Russia enhance the importance of commercial banks' loan portfolio quality. The continuing growth of lending to non-financial sector against the backdrop of its stagnation represents an empirical anomaly, which may be explained by the current bank debt restructuring.
Objectives The aim of the study is a comprehensive review of restructuring activity of commercial banks in terms of theory, methods of measuring and analyzing the restructuring processes in the lending activity of domestic commercial banks.
Methods The methodology of the study includes methods of comparative and correlation analysis. The sample includes the largest banking organizations by loans granted to the non-financial sector. The study includes the time period from 2002 to 2015, the basic period of the sample is both the annual and monthly variables.
Results The results of the study include theoretical and practical aspects. So, from the theoretical point of view, I propose a simple model of multiple equilibria for the restructured assets market. I highlight factors that have a potential to impact the scale and elasticity of supply and demand in this market.
Conclusions The obtained results allow making the following conclusions: the share of restructured loans in the corporate lending market during the period under investigation has been steadily increasing; the continuation of this trend in the corporate credit market is fraught with its degeneration into a pyramid based on the Ponzi scheme; the main reason of this trend is a dysfunction of economic institutions in Russia.

Keywords: credit, bank, restructuring, market

References:

  1. Rajan R. Why bank credit policies fluctuate: a theory and some evidence. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, no. 109, pp. 399–441.
  2. Bernanke B., Gertler M., Gilchrist S. The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1996, no. 78, pp. 1–15.
  3. Barth J.R., Caprio G., Levine R. Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels Govern. Cambridge University Press, 2008, 446 p.
  4. Hauswald R., Marquez R. Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets. Review of Economic Studies, 2006, no. 19, pp. 967–1000.
  5. Manove M., Padilla A.J. Pagano M. Creditor Rights and Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks. Boston, United States. Mimeographed document, 1999.
  6. Bester H. Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information. American Economic Review, 1985, no. 75, pp. 850–855.
  7. Burakov D.V. Propagation Mechanism of Credit Risk in the Credit Cycle. European Journal of Social Sciences, 2014, no. 41(4), pp. 539–545.
  8. Burakov D.V. Limited Liability Problem, Bank Capital and Credit Cycles. A Behavioral Economic Approach. Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research, 2014, no. 21(1), pp. 28–32.
  9. Padilla A.J., Requejo A. The Costs and Benefits of Strict Protection of Creditor Rights: Theory and Evidence. Available at: Link.
  10. Minsky H. The Financial Instability Hypothesis. The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper, 1992, no. 74. Available at: Link.
  11. Bregel' E.Ya. Denezhnoe obrashchenie i kredit kapitalisticheskikh stran [Monetary supply and the credit of the capitalist countries]. Moscow, Finansy Publ., 1955, 376 p.
  12. Shevchenko S.I. [Restructuring of debts as a way of economic growth]. Upravlencheskii uchet i finansy = Management Accounting and Finance, 2007, no. 1, pp. 66–74.
  13. Popov E.Yu. [Debt restructuring and the amicable agreement in preventing the bankruptcy of an individual]. Pravo i ekonomika = Law and Economy, 2011, no. 8, pp. 51–57.
  14. Quagliariello M. Bank's Riskiness Over the Business Cycle: A panel analysis on Italian intermediaries. Available at: Link.
  15. Geanakoplos J. The Leverage Cycle. Chapter in NBER Book NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, University of Chicago Press, 2010, vol. 24, pp. 1–65.
  16. Acharya V.V. A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation. Journal of Financial Stability, 2009, no. 5, pp. 224–255.
  17. Burakov D.V. [Indication of corporate lending cycles]. Bankovskoe kreditovanie = Bank Lending, 2013, no. 3, pp. 8–19. (In Russ.)

View all articles of issue

 

ISSN 2311-8709 (Online)
ISSN 2071-4688 (Print)

Journal current issue

Vol. 30, Iss. 4
April 2024

Archive