+7 925 966 4690, 9am6pm (GMT+3), Monday – Friday
ИД «Финансы и кредит»

JOURNALS

  

FOR AUTHORS

  

SUBSCRIBE

    
Economic Analysis: Theory and Practice
 

On opportunities to achieve market equilibrium in the global oil market

Vol. 22, Iss. 3, MARCH 2023

Received: 29 December 2022

Received in revised form: 14 February 2023

Accepted: 20 February 2023

Available online: 30 March 2023

Subject Heading: MATHEMATICAL METHODS AND MODELS

JEL Classification: С71, С72, F51, F53, F63

Pages: 574–594

https://doi.org/10.24891/ea.22.3.574

Mikhail I. KUTERNIN State University of Management (SUM), Moscow, Russian Federation
kadet503122@list.ru

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2388-5951

Subject. The global oil market has experienced qualitative changes caused by the introduction of non-market methods into its regulation system, like the use of embargo, setting a price ceiling, stiffening sanctions. These changes require new approaches to studying the oil market and identifying the opportunities for its development.
Objectives. The study aims to develop tools enabling to analyze the latest trends in the market transformation and identify possible ways of its development, to determine stable market conditions, and analyze possibilities of achieving market equilibrium.
Methods. The main method of research is mathematical modeling. The methodology involves typification of object, taking into account its latest changes, building an appropriate research model, and verifying its adequacy by applying to the analysis of previous stages of market development.
Results. I constructed a game model reflecting the main features of the oligopolistic market of goods with saturated demand. The model helped determine the main features of possible stable agreements in the oil market. The paper establishes the correspondence of the results of model experiments and real stable conditions of the world market.
Conclusions. The model is suitable to examine the current state of the world oil market. The study of recent non-market methods is possible by including consumer countries in the set of players in the model.

Keywords: global oil market, oligopoly, saturated demand, game- theory model, stable condition

References:

  1. Popova I.M. [Geopolitical Factors and Their Role in the Development of the International Oil Market: A Literature Review]. Vestnik mezhdunarodnykh organizatsii: obrazovanie, nauka, novaya ekonomika = International Organisations Research Journal, 2020, vol. 15, no. 3, pp. 282–306. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  2. Miriello C. Energy Security and Geopolitics in the Trans-Europe Space. In: Giusti S., Mirkina I. (eds) The EU in a Trans-European Space. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019. URL: Link
  3. Pusenkova N.N. [The Low-carbon Future of Hydrocarbon Companies: The Case of American and European Oil Producers]. EKO = ECO, 2021, no. 7, pp. 73–96. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  4. Pusenkova N.N. [Climate policy of national oil companies: De-carbonization in a European way or in an American way?]. Problemy ekonomiki i upravleniya neftegazovym kompleksom = Problems of Economics and Management of Oil and Gas Complex, 2021, no. 11, pp. 52–62. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  5. Plakandaras V., Gupta R., Wong W.K. Point and density forecasts of oil returns: The role of geopolitical risks. Resource Policy, 2019, vol. 62, pp. 580–587. URL: Link
  6. Volotkovskaya N.S., Volotkovskaya Yu.A., Semenov A.S. [The global energy market: Analysis of energy production and demand, sector prospects]. Sovremennaya nauka: aktual'nye problemy teorii i praktiki. Ser.: Ekonomika i pravo = Modern Science: Actual Problems of Theory and Practice, 2020, no. 6, pp. 12–17. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  7. Malova T.A., Sysoeva V.I. [The World Oil Market: The Search for Balance in the New "Oil" Reality]. Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta = MGIMO Review of International Relations, 2016, no. 6, pp. 115–124. (In Russ.) URL: Link
  8. Pusenkova N.N. Natsional'nye neftyanye kompanii v novykh realiyakh mirovoi energetiki [National oil companies in the new realities of world energy]. Moscow, Ideya-Press Publ., 2022, 400 p.
  9. Shutaeva E.A., Pobirchenko V.V. [World oil market: Analysis of production and demand, Russia’s position]. Nauchnyi vestnik: finansy, banki, investitsii = Scientific Bulletin: Finance, Banking, Investment, 2021, no. 2, pp. 170–184. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  10. Nastych M.A. [Analysis of management collusive decisions on the world oil market]. Rossiiskii zhurnal menedzhmenta = Russian Management Journal, 2018, vol. 16, no. 3, pp. 371–392. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  11. Petrosian O., Li Y., Nastych M. The Looking Forward Approach in a Differential Game Model of the Oil Market with Non-transferable Utility. In: Petrosyan L.A., Mazalov V.V., Zenkevich N.A. (eds) Frontiers of Dynamic Games. Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications. Birkhäuser, Cham, 2020, pp. 215–244. URL: Link
  12. Konyukhovskiy P.V., Holodkova V.V. Cooperative Game Theory Methods in the Analysis of Economic and Political Interaction at the International Level. Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2021, vol. 14, pp. 192–215. URL: Link
  13. Case J.H. Economics and the Competitive Process. New York, New York University Press, 1979, 295 p.
  14. Kuternin M.I., Silaev A.A. [Improving the efficiency of investment programs for the development of the region oil industry]. Finansovye rynki i banki = Financial Markets and Banks, 2022, no. 7, pp. 41–46. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  15. Kuternin M.I., Silaev A.A. [Optimization of investment processes for the development of the oil industry]. Ekonomika i upravlenie: problemy, resheniya = Economics and Management: Problems, Solutions, 2022, vol. 1, no. 9, pp. 101–107. (In Russ.) URL: Link
  16. Luce R.D., Raiffa H. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York, Wiley, 1957, 509 p.
  17. Imangozhina Z.A., Niyazbekova Sh.U. [The international economic cooperation of Gulf States in gas sector]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta im. S.Yu. Vitte. Ser. 1: Ekonomika i upravlenie, 2019, no. 1. (In Russ.) URL: Link
  18. Aumann R.J. Acceptable Points in General Cooperative N-Person Games. In: Contributions to the Theory of Games (AM-40), vol. IV. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2018, pp. 287–324. URL: Link
  19. Nastych M.A. [Strong Nash equilibrium for oligopoly with quantity and price settings]. Dal'nevostochnyi matematicheskii zhurnal, 2019, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 223–234. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  20. Moulin H. Theorie des jeux pour l’economie et la politique. Paris, Hermann, 1981, 248 p.
  21. Germeier Yu.B. [On two-person games with a fixed sequence of moves]. Doklady Akademii nauk SSSR, 1971, vol. 198, no. 5, pp. 1001–1004. URL: Link (In Russ.)
  22. Malova T.A. [Competition for World Leadership as Risk Factor of Global Instability]. Strakhovoe delo, 2018, no. 6, pp. 3–9. URL: Link (In Russ.)

View all articles of issue

 

ISSN 2311-8725 (Online)
ISSN 2073-039X (Print)

Journal current issue

Vol. 23, Iss. 3
March 2024

Archive