Importance The collusion for setting prices, sharing clients and markets becomes a beneficial business strategy. However, it proves to be an ineffective practice resulting in overpricing, production slowdown, and reduction in market actors. This is the reason why many countries consider that the collusion of businesses considerably obstructs the free market processes being the primary evil for the competition. Under the current circumstances in the Russian market, governmental authorities become active parties to such agreements, rather than only businesses, with oligopolistic markets and markets with monopolistic competition both being exposed to the collusive practices. Objectives The study aims at the analysis of reasons, formats of anti-competitive agreements, and identification of the specificity. It also determines the economic policy trends to prevent and suppress the collusion in Russia. Methods Relying on the data collected by the Federal Antimonopoly Service for three years (2011-2013), the author examines the prevailing types of collusion, markets exposed to anti-competitive agreements, punishment of colluding parties. Results The Russian practices mainly include the collusion about price fixing and sharing markets, tenders, coordination of economic activities and collusion involving governmental authorities. The collusion takes the minor part of other antimonopoly abuses since it is difficult to prove. As for difficulties in preventing such abuses, the study refers to the absence of any methods to estimate damage the collusion causes to the economy, clear principles for punishment of colluding parties, and governmental officials de facto escaping the punishment. Conclusions and Relevance The author concludes that authorities become the main party to the collusion in question. The collusion is mainly typical of the services market. When articulating and implementing the antimonopoly policy, it is necessary to consider the specificity of some markets, consequences of anti-competitive activities, and duration of such abuses.
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