Tsurikov V.I.Doctor of Economic Sciences, PhD of Physics and Mathematics Sciences, Professor of the Department of Higher Mathematics, Kostroma State Agricultural Academy tsurikov@inbox.ru
A mathematical model for selection by the taxpayer of the income amount to be concealed from taxes is offered. The model allows for a possibility of avoiding the liability for tax evasion tax by means of a bribe. The nature of dependence between the amount of the generated profit and the declared part thereof from the tax authorities efficiency, tax rates, transaction costs involved in profit concealment and severity of the liability for giving a bribe and tax evasion have been defined.
Keywords: taxpayer, rational behavior, tax evasion, the severity of punishment, corruption, bribe
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