Igor’ V. KOSTIKOVDoctor of Economic Sciences, Professor, specialist in institutional economics, macroeconomic analysis and property theory, Moscow, Russian Federation ikostikov@yahoo.com ORCID id: not available
Subject. The Russian model of self-regulation in the stock market and mechanisms of interaction between the Bank of Russia and professional associations. Objectives. To identify institutional factors and mechanisms of regulatory capture that contribute to the systemic weakening of retail investor rights protection under mandatory self-regulation. Methods. A systems approach was used, incorporating methods of institutional analysis, comparative legal studies and path dependency analysis. Results. A lack of institutional balance in the governance structure of self-regulatory organizations (SROs) has been identified. This is reflected in a shortage of independent directors and the combination of lobbying functions with supervisory ones. A regressive evolution of standards between 2003 and 2024 has been noted, characterized by the transformation of mandatory norms on asset segregation and fiduciary responsibility into facultative contractual options. Mechanisms of capture at the stages of norm design and their selective enforcement have been identified. The influence of the “revolving doors” practice and the high concentration of political capital in the leadership of professional associations on the operational independence of the state regulator has been detected. Measures to overcome regulatory capture and protect investor rights have been recommended. Conclusions and Relevance. The current architecture of Russian self-regulation reflects deep regulatory capture, in which the interests of the financial elite systematically prevail over the objectives of ensuring financial stability and long-term protection of retail market participants. The results expand the knowledge base on the functioning of financial institutions and enhance the competencies of the Bank of Russia and the Government of the Russian Federation regarding the improvement of supervisory policy and the reform of the self-regulation system.
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