Subject. The structure of the company's equity, formed through multi-voting shares. Objectives. Modeling of the optimal capital structure of a company formed using multi-voting shares in conditions of freedom to set the value of the voting multiplier. Methods. General scientific research methods have been applied, including generalization, argumentation, analysis, and modeling. Results. It is determined that in the Russian financial market, due to the absence of legislative restrictions regarding the establishment of the number of votes per multi-voting share, the voting multiplier is determined by internal factors. Recommendations are proposed for modeling the optimal capital structure, including multi-voting shares: defining the boundaries of the actual and planned ratio of ordinary and multi-voting shares in the structure of equity, determining the weight of multi-voting shares in the total number of votes and the possibility of reducing it during the company's transition to another stage of the life cycle; changing the structure of equity and taking into account the expected level of dilution of capital in the presence of convertible financial instruments, including preferred shares. Conclusions. The construction of three scenarios for the formation of the company's capital structure (ordinary and multi–voting shares; ordinary, preferred and multi-voting; ordinary, dilutive securities and multi-voting) allowed us to form an approach that takes into account the company's ability to attract additional financing as it grows and maintains attention to the interests of existing shareholders - owners of multi-voting shares. The advantage of the developed approach is the ability to use both the current or projected structure of the company's equity and the established value of the voting multiplier as a basis. The proposed approach to modeling the optimal capital structure of a company may be of interest in the Russian financial market for international companies (since currently only they can use multi-voting shares to raise capital), as well as for companies operating in other financial markets where the regulator does not limit the number of votes per multi-voting share.
Keywords: two-class system, equity, capital structure, financial instrument, security
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