Subject. The study is aimed at a comprehensive analysis of the impact of public administration on the capital structure of Russian companies during the period of macroeconomic instability in 2019–2023 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and sanctions pressure. Objectives. To empirically identify and outline the impact of government involvement on key parameters of the capital structure and financial strategy of companies in the context of external shocks. Methods. The study is based on a panel analysis of data on 10,000 largest Russian companies (SPARK system). The study analyzes the relationship between the degree of state control (binary indicator, controlling interest ? 50%, full ownership) and the parameters of the capital structure (DebtToAssets, CASHTA). Results. It has been established that companies with state participation demonstrate a statistically significant conservative financial policy characterized by a lower debt burden and higher liquidity. It is revealed that these differences are due to the action of three key mechanisms of public administration: direct preferential financing (concessional loans, subsidies); state guarantee of risks through development institutions; targeted tax and regulatory preferences. Conclusions. The study empirically confirms that public administration mechanisms are a key factor in shaping a conservative financial strategy, which provides companies with increased resilience to short-term macroeconomic shocks. In the long term, the identified model creates potential risks for efficiency, forming distortions of the competitive environment and dependence on government support.
Keywords: capital structure, government involvement, sanctions pressure, financial stability, panel regression
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